CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 261

2.

NIGERIA

But to make

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THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS said that the situation

in Nigeria was confused, but it was increasingly unlikely that there would

be a clear victory for either side. The eighteen jet aircraft recently

delivered to the Federal Government by the Eastern Bloc were unlikely to

play a significant military role in the near future: there were no

Nigerian pilots able to fly them and the Russians had refused to train mercenaries. Moreover, there were few airfields from which they could be

used and no facilities for storing suitable fuel.

Our present policy on the supply of arms to Nigeria was based on the

Prime Minister's letter of 16th July to General Gowon, Head of the Federal

Military Government which said that we did not intend to put any obstacle

in the way of orders placed in this country for reasonable quantities of

military materials of types similar to those obtained in the past.

Wo had, however, refused to supply sophisticated weapons (e.g. aircraft, rockets, tanks, armoured cars). When the Mid-Western Region was occupied by Eastern

forces on 9th August, we had reviewed our policy. The possibility was

considered, but rejected, of a complete cut-off of arms supplies to both

sides. We should have lost all influence with the Federal Government:

and there are some 17,000 British lives at stake in the West and the North (as against only about 300 now remaining in the East). Moreover, in the

event of a Federal victory all our influence would be needed in the cause of

moderation. The alternative of giving full support and aid to the Federal

Government had also to be rejected since a quick victory appeared

increasingly unlikely and large-scale civilian casualties as a result of

bombing by aircraft supplied from the United Kingdon would not have been

acceptable to British public opinion.

In all these circumstances, the

only course seemed to be to adhere to our previous policy in respect of

supplies of arms.

The possibility had also been considered of a public call by

Her Majesty's Government for peace talks: but it was judged that it would

be counter-productive. We knew, moreover, that Mr. Arnold Smith, the

Commonwealth Secretary-General, was proposing to make a secret peace initiative. He had since written, with our encouragement, to both General Govon and Colonel Ojukwu, the Military Governor of the Eastern Region proposing a truce in the land fighting (but not a cessation of the sea

blockade) in order to permit peace talks to be held. General Gowon had

rejected this proposal in moderate terms which had left the way open for

a further initiative. Colonel Ojukwu's reaction was not yet known.

The

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